My India First

My India First

When Indian Navy’s ‘Killer Squadron’ Set Karachi Port On Fireplace In 1971; Navy Day; Operation Trident


For the primary time, anti-ship missiles had been used within the area.

Within the inevitability of a 1971 struggle between India and Pakistan, Chief of Military Employees, Normal Sam Manekshaw, gave Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a paper on which he wrote December 4, the date on which India will go to struggle with Pakistan. On December 3, Pakistan bombed 9 Indian airfields, and the struggle broke out.

The Indian Navy emerged as a pivotal power within the liberation of East Pakistan. India’s maritime power operated in two theatres – Japanese and Western – and ensured a Naval blockade to interrupt the hyperlink between East and West Pakistan.

Operation Trident

The armed forces had been getting ready for the struggle for months. After the air raids by Pakistan, orders had been dispatched to the Western Naval Command (WNC) for ‘Operation Trident’. Vice Admiral SN Kohli (Later Admiral) was the Flag Officer C-in-C of the WNC, and orders got to dispatch the Naval fleet in Mumbai and Okha. The plan was to bomb the Karachi port.

The ‘Karachi Strike Group’ from the twenty fifth Missile Boat Squadron, often known as the ‘Killer Squadron’, consisted of two Petya-class ships – Katchal and Kiltan – and three missile boats – INS Nirghat, Nipat, and Veer. One missile boat was stationed on the Dwarka port to supply cowl. The missile boats had been armed with 4 Russian Styx Floor-to-Floor missiles every.

Commander Babru Bhan Yadav, the Killer Squadron’s commanding officer, was ordered to dispatch for an offensive on Karachi port. The plan was to assault Karachi port on December 3, however the air raids by Pakistan occurred within the night, making it tough to launch an operation on the identical day; due to this fact, D-day was modified to December 4.

The Petyas had been tasked to accompany the missile boats with their appropriate radar, present higher targets, and tow a ship in case of an emergency. Earlier than the struggle, the Pakistan Navy created a 75-mile (120 km) demarcation line for all service provider ships certain for Karachi and ordered them to not function in that zone between sundown and daybreak, and any boat picked on radar could be a Pakistani boat on patrol.

When the ‘Killer Squadron’ strike group reached 112 km south of Karachi, a goal was recognized northwest at a spread of 70 km, and one other goal was noticed by the radar virtually 68 km northeast. The strike group recognized them as warships and Styx missiles, with a spread of 75 km, had been ready for launch.

INS Nirghat engaged with the goal within the northwest and fired two Styx missiles. The Styx destroyed PNS Khaibar. INS Nipat fired two missiles and sank a service provider ship, MV Venus Challenger, which was reportedly loaded with arms for the Pakistani military. INS Veer destroyed PNS Muhafiz, a coastal minesweeper.

In his e book Transition to Triumph, Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani provides an analyzed account of the operation. When the strike group began closing in in the direction of Karachi, INS Nirghat’s radar mistook anti-aircraft tracer shells fired as plane, which created confusion and worry of a Pakistani air raid.

Karachi Port On Fireplace

Commander BB Yadav onboard INS Nipat fired his remaining Styx missiles on the Kemari oil refinery and set it on fireplace. The assault was profitable, and no loss was reported. It was the best hour within the historical past of the Indian Navy. 4 days later, Operation Python was the final nail within the coffin. INS Vinash, Talwar, and Trishul sank PNS Dacca, broken MV Harmattan and MV Gulf, and the Kemari oil refinery burnt for days. Pakistan Navy’s presence on the western entrance was in ashes, and India had full maritime dominance.

For the primary time, anti-ship missiles had been used within the area. Commander Babru Bhan Yadav was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra for his gallant motion, and the Navy celebrates December 4 as ‘Navy Day’ to honour the battle.

The bombing of Karachi port and the oil refinery resulted in a lack of round $3 billion to Pakistan and a large scarcity of oil for Pakistani plane. It additionally lower the Sea Strains of Communication (SLOC) between East and West Pakistan and blocked any provide of US weapons to Pakistan by way of Karachi.

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